CHAPTER 8

FORCE READINESS

"Again and again the readiness was tested and not found wanting, not on the night when we launched an invasion to Haiti, then called it back, and then in hours reformulated and reorganized the entire operation. Nor was it found wanting when, even while we were engaged in Haiti, our forces rapidly responded to the unexpected movement of Saddam's divisions towards Kuwait's border. Hollow forces don't have this kind of edge."

General John Shalikashvili, Chairman, former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECTION I
INTRODUCTION

8-1. Maintaining readiness

General Shalikashvili's statement stands as a marker against which future readiness will subjectively measured. As the Army begins the 21st century, it confronts the major challenge of maintaining readiness. Maintaining readiness requires difficult decisions by the Army leadership, for they must strike the proper balance between maintaining current readiness and building towards future readiness requirements. The Army guides its decisions by balancing the fundamental imperatives that have shaped the development of today's Army: quality people, doctrine, force mix, training, modern equipment, and leader development (Figure 8-1).



Figure 8-1. Balancing the Imperatives

8-2. Chapter content

In order to make the decisions necessary to achieve and maintain a combat ready force, the Department of Defense (DOD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Department of Army (DA) have developed systems to assist the leadership at all levels in managing force readiness. This chapter discusses the concepts on measuring force readiness and the systems and procedures used to prompt decisions to respond to readiness issues. This chapter will discuss

how the Army uses the Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL) and authorized level of organization (ALO) systems to manage both readiness and resourcing. It provides insights regarding the difficulty of defining readiness both qualitatively and quantitatively. Specifically the following processes are discussed: the Chairman's Readiness System to measure current and future readiness; the role of the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR), the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments (JWCA); and the role of the DOD Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC). Finally, the Army's readiness system is discussed to include the Chief of Staff's monthly reviews and the unit status report criteria.

SECTION II
MANAGING FORCE READINESS

8-3. Definitions of readiness

The Army defines unit readiness as the ability of a unit to deliver the output for which it was designed. However, the Army also uses the term "force readiness" which can be equated to the DOD term "military capability." Force readiness is defined as the readiness of the Army within its established force structure, as measured by its ability to station, control, man, equip, replenish, modernize, and train its forces in peacetime, while concurrently planning to call up, mobilize, prepare, deploy, employ, and sustain them in war to accomplish assigned missions. DOD defines military capability in relation to force readiness, sustainability, force structure, modernization, and infrastructure (Figure 8-2). This definition is directly linked to how the total force is planned, programmed, and budgeted. These combinations of force readiness functions can best be seen as a set of interrelated, sequential, responsive, reciprocal, and comprehensive functions for the preparation and conduct of war. The functions are responsive to the time-phasing requirements of war plans.

Figure 8-2. The Components of Military Capability



8-4. Factors affecting force readiness

a. Force readiness is affected by many quantitative and qualitative factors. For example, it is fairly easy to measure the status of personnel, equipment, or war reserves. It is not so easy to assign a value to morale or cohesion. Force readiness is dynamic, encompasses many functions, and is influenced by many factors. Because of this, the Army has not yet developed a single measurement system to measure force readiness in its totality. To illustrate its complexity, consider the following partial listing of factors that impact on the force readiness of the Army:

- Unit status.
- Design of weapons systems.
- Construction of facilities.

- Availability of supplies.
- Relationship with allies.
- Strategic intelligence capability.
- Application of unit manning principles of Cohesion, Operational Readiness, and Training.
- Civilian personnel force planning—availability and experience; strategic force sustainment.
- Quality of soldier/family services in support of deployments.
- Civilian and military airlift.
- Civilian and military sealift.
- Civilian and military land transportation assets.
- Lines of communications.
- Availability of pre-stocked equipment.
- Mobilization capability.
- Recruitment of manpower for military and industry.
- Capability to receive, process, and transport forces in theaters.
- Senior leadership—quality of strategic planning and decision-making.
- Capability of the enemy.
- Quality and morale of personnel.

b. Estimating force readiness is difficult and highly situational. The American people and their elected representatives need to know how much security is required and what it costs. Short of the military's performance in war or deterring war, a defined measure of return on the dollar that the Services can show is the level of force readiness to execute the National Military Strategy (NMS), as deduced from analytical tools and other indicators.

8-5. Cost of force readiness.

a. Force readiness is expensive and must be balanced against other program needs (Figure 8-3). Within a finite amount of resources, the purchase of a balanced program that satisfies future investment needs such as research and development and procurement can impact current readiness needs such as spare parts, depot maintenance, and war reserves. The Army's move to a smaller force and need for immediate response to a wide variety of requirements put great demands on it to maintain forces at a high state of readiness.



Figure 8-3. The Cost of Force Readiness

b. Readiness costs increase sharply as higher levels of readiness are approached. At the unit level, maximum readiness is highly perishable. A unit can attain a very high level of readiness and a short time later, without continued intensive resource allocation, have the trained expertise and peak maintenance levels ebb away. The availability of repair parts and supplies, length of time between training events, and personnel turbulence all have a tremendous influence on unit readiness.

c. The readiness costs compound one of the most perplexing problems facing the Army, that of tying resources to readiness. The resource-to-readiness relationship is complex but essential to the proper management of total force capability; the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES); and justification of Army programs to Congress.

8-6. Resourcing readiness

a. Tiered resourcing. Because of readiness costs and the response times of war plans, the Army maintains some units at a higher level of readiness than others. This stratification of readiness is brought about through a "tiered resourcing" policy. Tiered resourcing means providing the highest level of warfighting resources to units in accordance with DOD's long-standing "first to fight, first resourced" policy.

b. Force packages. The first step in tiered resourcing is to prioritize units into force packages. Force package categorizations are contained in The Army Plan(TAP) and are rank-ordered for resource planning guidance. Force packages are based upon approved war plans and unit commitment dates. A major factor for units not based within the theater of operations is their strategic deployment date, which is driven by the availability of strategic lift and the order of priority assigned by operational or contingency plans.

c. ALO and DAMPL. The next step in tiered resourcing is the management of the distribution of resources using the Army's resourcing priority tools, ALO and DAMPL. A unit's ALO determines the allocation of manpower spaces and distribution of personnel. The Army assigns ALOs to units commensurate with their primary mission and required availability dates from war plans. The Army is the only service that uses an ALO system, which has a direct effect on unit status levels. ALO is expressed in numerically designated levels representing percentages of full TOE/MTOE manpower spaces. For example, ALO 1 is 100 percent, ALO 2 approximately 90 percent, ALO 3 approximately 80 percent, and ALO 4 approximately 70 percent. A unit's ALO is listed in Section I of its MTOE. The DAMPL rank orders units based on their strategic priority or their projected deployment/employment sequence. This standing order of precedence list, approved by the senior Army leadership, is used to guide the peacetime distribution of personnel and equipment resources used or controlled by Department of the Army. Distributing scarce resources in DAMPL sequence allows the Army to optimize the

readiness value of its assets where the risk or probability of conflict is greatest or where the least flexibility and time exist to correct shortages.

SECTION III
CHAIRMAN'S READINESS SYSTEM

8-7. System overview

a. System purpose. The Chairman's Readiness System was implemented in the fall of 1994. It was designed to provide the CJCS the information necessary to fulfill the Title 10, USC responsibilities. The system applies to the Joint Staff, Services, unified commands, and the Department of Defense combat support agencies (CSAs). The system is designed to assess both unit and joint readiness. Unit readiness focuses on people, training, and equipment. Joint readiness assesses key functional areas that enable the CINCs to integrate and synchronize forces. The Chairman's Readiness System is designed to provide a current, macro-level assessment of the military's readiness to execute the NMS. Long-term readiness and modernization issues are addressed by the JWCA process or by the JROC. Until recently, readiness was defined as the capability of a unit to accomplish the mission for which it was designed. Readiness was service-oriented, with no consideration given to requirements to operate as an integral part of a joint or combined multinational force.

b. Responsibilities. The CJCS is responsible for assessing the strategic level of readiness of the Armed Forces to fight and meet the demands of the full range of the NMS. Readiness at this level is defined as the synthesis of readiness at the operational and tactical levels. It also focuses on broad functional areas such as intelligence and mobility to meet worldwide demands. The operational level of readiness is the responsibility of the CINCs and considers the joint perspective. Joint readiness is defined as the CINC's ability to integrate and synchronize ready combat and support forces in order to execute assigned missions. Readiness at the tactical level remains the primary responsibility of the Services. Unit readiness is defined as the ability to provide the capabilities required by CINCs to execute their assigned missions. These definitions are considered key because they delineate the responsibilities of the CJCS, Service Chiefs, and CINCs in maintaining and assessing readiness (Figure 8-4).



Figure 8-4. Chairman's Readiness System

8-8. Assessing current joint readiness

a. Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR).

(1) *JMRR types.* The JMRR provides the CJCS a current and broad assessment of the military readiness to fight across all three levels of war. There are three components of the JMRR: a Full JMRR, By-exception JMRR and Feedback JMRR, conducted on a 3-month cycle. The Full JMRR is conducted quarterly (usually during the first month of the quarter) or as requested by the CJCS. The Services present an assessment of unit readiness. The CINCs and CSAs submit an assessment of joint readiness in response to a specific scenario defined in the CJCS JMRR guidance message. The J3, Joint Staff compiles the information and presents a combined readiness assessment of the CINCs and the CSAs. The By-Exception JMRR is used to identify significant changes reported since the last Full JMRR, with the focus, both positive and negative, on current and projected assessments. A briefing is scheduled only if the changes have a major warfighting impact. A By-exception JMRR could be scheduled for the second month of the quarter. The Feedback JMRR is normally conducted during the third month of the quarter. It provides a forum to review the status of actions to address specific current readiness deficiencies raised in previous Full JMRR or By-exception JMRR assessments.

(2) *JMRR responsibilities.* The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) chairs the JMRR. The Director of Operations (J3) organizes the process and presents the joint readiness briefing. All Directors of the Joint Staff attend the JMRR briefing. The Service Vice Chiefs are the senior service representatives to the JMRR meeting. The Service Operations Deputies present the unit readiness briefing for their respective Services. During a Full JMRR, the Services report on current real-world force commitments and force assignments to a notional warfighting scenario. Data include current unit location, current and projected unit readiness, support force capability and readiness, and major Service readiness trends in the areas of personnel, equipment, training and enabler. In support force capability the following six major areas are assessed: theater mobility support; engineers; health services; sustainability; security; and field services. Services will also provide an executive level summary of current tempo and its associated impact on readiness. The CINCs submit a readiness assessment in the eight functional areas that enable them to integrate and synchronize forces to execute their assigned missions (Figure 8-5). The U.S. Special Operations Command representative briefs unit

readiness in generally the same format as the Services. The CSAs submit assessments in the same eight functional areas as the CINCs. Agency directors provide a narrative assessment of the agency's ability to support the CINCs. The CINCs and CSAs submit a current assessment and a 12-month projection of how ready they are to support their current worldwide and theater requirements. They also respond to how ready they are to meet the specific scenario identified in the CJCS JMRR guidance message. They use a C-1 to C-4 scale which is similar to the Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS) criteria covered later in this chapter.

- Joint personnel
- Intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance
- Special operations
- Mobility
- Logistics/sustainment
- Infrastructure
- Command/control/communications/ computers
- Joint war planning and training

Figure 8-5. Joint Readiness Functional Areas

(3) *JMRR outputs.* With the consolidated responses of the Services, CINCs, and CSAs, the JMRR provides a current readiness assessment at the strategic level. It produces an assessment of the Armed Forces readiness to fight and meet the demands of the NMS. In addition, the JMRR produces a list of CINC and Service current readiness deficiencies which are further categorized as strategic concerns. Based on these concerns an overall risk assessment at the strategic level is reported to the Senior Readiness Oversight Council.

b. Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC). The SROC brings together the senior civilian (Deputy Secretary of Defense, Under Secretaries of Defense and of the Military Departments) and military leadership (VCJCS, Service Chiefs, and others) in a monthly meeting to review significant readiness topics. At each meeting the Service Chiefs provide a current and projected assessment of their unit status, similar in scope and form to the assessment provided in the JMRR. The VCJCS provides a joint readiness assessment and overall assessment of the readiness of the Armed Forces to fight and meet the demands of the NMS. Specific readiness issues can also be discussed at this meeting.

c. Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC). The *DOD Authorization Act of 1996* requires within 30 days following the end of each calendar quarter a report sent to Congress based on readiness assessments provided to a DOD forum (SROC) with responsibility for readiness oversight. The Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC) is approved by the Secretary of Defense prior to forwarding to Congress.

d. Fixing Current Readiness. The results of joint and Service actions to address readiness deficiencies are presented to the VCJCS and the Service Vice Chiefs at Feedback JMRR meetings. Deficiencies can either be resolved by accepting the risk they pose or by taking direct action to correct the shortfall. The Joint Staff directorates lead the deficiency analysis effort for their respective functional areas. Close coordination is required among the Joint Staff, Service Staffs, CINCs, and DOD agency staffs. Appropriate CINC mission impacts are analyzed; solutions and "workarounds" are proposed; and courses of action are approved. In addition to the

quarterly Feedback JMRR meetings, a semiannual JMRR Deficiency Review is conducted by the Director, J-3, in collaboration with the CINCs, Services, and CSAs, to update the status and validate the categorization of all deficiencies in the JMRR database.

8-9. Assessing future readiness

Broad responsibility for assessing future joint requirements falls under the purview of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). The JROC, with membership of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Vice Chiefs of each Service, performs mission needs review, validates requirements, and makes recommendations on the placement of scarce dollars and resources to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The JROC provides a senior military perspective on the major weapons systems and other military capabilities required. (See Chapter 4 for discussion of JROC). The JROC uses the analytical process known as Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments (JWCA) to maintain continuity between current readiness and future capability. Because deficiencies identified in the JMRR may require long-term programmatic fixes, the deficiency may be passed to the appropriate JWCA assessment team for action. The JWCA ensures that the CINCs, Services, and CSAs are included in the assessment processes (See Chapter 4 for discussion of JWCA). The JROC uses the analytical assessments from the JWCA process to assist them in making informed decisions in preserving current capabilities while building future joint military capabilities through investments in people, force enhancements, modernization, and infrastructure.

8-10. Key relationships

The relationships between JMRR assessments, Full JMRR, Feedback JMRR, JROC/JWCA SROC, and QRRC are illustrated graphically at Figure 8-6.



Figure 8-6. JMRR/SROC/QRRC Cycle

8-11. Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS)

GSORTS is an internal management tool for use by the CJCS, Services, and combatant commands. GSORTS is the single, automated reporting system within the Department of Defense that functions as the central registry of all operational units of the Armed Forces. GSORTS provides a current snapshot on a select slice of resource areas: personnel, equipment on hand, equipment serviceability, and training. GSORTS measures the level of selected resources and training status required to undertake the missions for which the unit was designed and organized. GSORTS is designed to support, in priority order, information requirements related to crisis response planning; deliberate or peacetime planning; and management responsibilities to organize, train, and equip forces for use by the CINCs. GSORTS provides the CJCS with the necessary unit information to achieve adequate and feasible military response to crisis situations and participate in the joint planning and execution process associated with deliberate planning. GSORTS also provides data used by other automated systems (JOPES, GCCS) in support of the joint planning process.

SECTION IV
ARMY READINESS

8-12. Unit status report purpose

The unit status report (USR) is the Army's input to GSORTS. The primary purpose of the USR is to provide the National Command Authorities, JCS, HQDA, and all levels of the Army's chain of command with the current status of U.S. Army units and necessary information for making operational decisions. The USR is designed to measure the status of resources and training level of a unit at a given point in time. The reports should not be used in isolation to assess overall unit readiness or the broader aspects of Army force readiness. The USR provides a timely single source document for assessing key elements of unit status. It does not provide all the information necessary to manage resources.

8-13. USR relationship to joint readiness

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3401.02B requires all reporting units to report their status in the areas of personnel, equipment on hand, equipment serviceability, and training. The Army Unit Status Reporting System is required by Army Regulation 220-1 and provides the data required in CJCSI 3401.02B. The Army requires additional data that increases the value of the USR as a resource management and operations tool. The supplemental data required by the Army was selected by HQDA in coordination with the MACOMs. This information passes through but is not retained by the Joint Staff. The higher level of detail allows units to better express their status and all levels of command to use the report to analyze key status indicators (Figures 8-7 and 8-8).



Figure 8-7. Active Army and Army Reserve Unit Status Reporting Channels



Figure 8-8. Army National Guard Unit Status Reporting Channels

8-14. USR changes

The current version of AR 220-1 was published in September 1997. The current version is reorganized along functional areas; gives commanders flexibility in determining personnel and equipment availability; requires reporting overall level for Army war reserve prepositioned sets; rescinds MACOM authority to exempt units from USR reporting while deployed or during training; and requires major combat unit commanders to derive two ratings for personnel and equipment on hand if units or elements of units are deployed.

8-15. USR procedures

a. Overall category level. USR data are transmitted through command and control communications channels. For this reason the report cannot be all-inclusive. Problems are highlighted for commanders and operators. Detailed reviews of problems are conducted using other data systems. Details of Army unit status reporting procedures are explicit in AR 220-1. Since procedures for measuring and reporting unit status have changed considerably with each revision, each commander, manager, or staff officer concerned with readiness should carefully study the detailed guidance and requirements of the latest edition. A summary of the key aspects of the procedure is included here to provide a basic understanding of the system. Chapter 2, AR 220-1 clearly identifies which units must report readiness. Reporting units are required to submit a USR covering their resource and training status levels. The overall category level (C-1, C-2, C-3, C-4, C-5) indicates the degree to which a unit has achieved prescribed levels of personnel and equipment, the training of those personnel, and the maintenance of the equipment. These levels reflect the status of the unit's resources and training measured against the resources and training required to undertake the wartime mission for which the unit is organized or designed. Category levels do not project a unit's combat ability once committed to action. The overall unit category level will be based only upon organic resources and training under the operational control of the reporting unit or its parent unit. The categories of overall unit levels are:

C-1. Unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake the full wartime mission(s) for which it is organized or designed.

C-2. Unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake most of the wartime mission(s) for which it is organized or designed.

C-3. Unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake many, but not all, portions of the wartime mission(s) for which it is organized or designed.

C-4. Unit requires additional resources or training to undertake its wartime mission(s), but it may be directed to undertake portions of its wartime mission(s) with resources on hand.

C-5. Unit is undergoing a service-directed resource change and is not prepared at this time to undertake the wartime mission for which it is organized or designed. C-5 units are restricted to the following:

- Units undergoing activation, inactivation, or conversion.
- Units manned or equipped below ALO-3 level.
- Units that are not manned or equipped but are required in the wartime structure.
- Units placed in cadre status by HQDA.

b. Personnel data. The USR provides the indicators of a unit's personnel status by comparing available strength, available MOS qualified strength, and available senior grade strength against wartime requirements. In addition, assigned strength and personnel turnover data are also provided.

c. Equipment on hand(EOH) data. The USR provides indicators of a reporting unit EOH status level by comparing the fill of selected equipment to wartime requirements. A level is determined for all of an MTOE unit's primary items of equipment to include: Principal Weapons Systems and Equipment (ERC A/P), each individual pacing item (ERC P), and support items of equipment (ERC B/C).

d. Equipment serviceability (ES). The USR provides an ES status level indicating how well a unit is maintaining its on-hand equipment. A status level is calculated for the on-hand

reportable equipment, referred to as pacing items (ERC P). A separate status level is calculated for each on-hand pacing item. The status level is calculated by comparing the aggregate Fully Mission Capable (FMC) rate for "all on-hand reportable equipment" regardless of ERC (including pacing items) and a separate calculation for each individual pacing item (ERC P). The units overall ES status is equal to the lower of these calculated levels.

e. Training data. The USR provides a training status for the reporting unit. The primary purpose of the unit training level indicates the current ability of the unit to perform assigned wartime missions. A secondary purpose of the unit training level shows resource shortfalls that prevent attainment of a training tempo necessary to achieve or maintain proficiency. A commander assesses his or her unit's ability to execute mission essential tasks (METL). The estimated number of training days needed to reach full proficiency determines a unit's training status level. This method of calculating training status is currently under revision by HQDA. The proposed change entails the addition of a second metric, a METL training percentage, in which the commander calculates a second training level based on the number of METL tasks trained, practiced, or untrained. The lower of the two metrics, training days needed to reach full METL proficiency and METL training percentage, will then determine the overall training level.

f. Mission accomplishment estimate (MAE). The MAE is the commander's subjective assessment of the unit's ability to execute that portion of its wartime mission it would be expected to perform if alerted/committed within 72 hours of the date of the report. The estimate is expressed in terms of the percent of wartime mission that can be accomplished if the unit were alerted/committed. An MAE is required from all reporting units. The MAE is also used for deployed units to report the effectiveness of the unit in executing its deployed mission(s).

g. Determining overall unit status level. To determine the overall unit status level, the commander reviews the status levels attained in the measured resource and training areas. The overall unit category level will normally be identical to the lowest level recorded in any of the unit's individually measured resource areas of personnel, equipment and hand, equipment serviceability, and training, but the overall category may be upgraded or downgraded by the unit commander. Modification of a unit's overall level by its commander does not permit modification of the computed status of each individually measured area, which must be reported without adjustment.

8-16. Use of USR data at HQDA

a. At HQDA, the USR is part of a larger readiness picture compiled from many functional reports and sources. It provides a quick channel whereby the chain of command is alerted to the status of units and, thus, can exercise the appropriate management actions and provide the required assistance. DA uses the USR in conjunction with other personnel and logistics reports to improve resource management of people, equipment, and the programming of facilities and training areas/exercises to increase the combat effectiveness of subordinate elements.

b. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS) receives the reports from the major commands through the JCS. Upon receipt, ODCSOPS prepares USR summaries for AA and RC units. Copies of these summaries, in the form of computer printouts, are provided to elements of the DA Staff, as well as other logistics and personnel agencies, and Service schools. Data may be assembled by type unit, OPLAN, major command, unit category, or in other formats to meet specific needs.

c. The Chief of Staff receives a monthly written readiness summary and briefing from the ODCSOPS, with significant input and analysis from the DCSPER, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG), and other ARSTAF elements. The status of major units by strategic force

package (SFP) is provided as well as a two-year projection of each resource area. Special interest items, such as division reorganization, equipment conversion, or critical personnel issues are covered. This briefing provides the latest readiness information to the Army leadership.

d. Each principal DA Staff element uses the information provided by ODCSOPS to effect resource allocation in consonance with the DAMPL and ALO. Aggregate data from the USR also serves as a yardstick to judge how well the functional systems of personnel, logistics, and training are performing.

SECTION V
SUMMARY AND REFERENCES

8-17. Summary

Readiness is a primary mission of military forces in peacetime. Recognizing that readiness is highly situational and subjective, it is, nevertheless, a yardstick for programming and budgeting. The Army's readiness strategy entails maximizing readiness within available resources to meet the demands of war plans. The more accurately the Army captures and quantifies readiness, the better the Army can articulate resource needs to the DOD and the Congress.

8-18. References

a. CJCS Instruction 3401.01B, *Chairman's Readiness System*.

b. CJCS Instruction 3401.02, *Global Status of Resources and Training System*.

c. CJCS Guide 3401A, *CJCS Guide to the Chairman's Readiness System.*

d. CJCS Manual 3150.02, *Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS)*.

e. Army Regulation 220-1, *Unit Status Reporting*.

f. Field Manual 100-11, *Force Integration*.